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In The Politics of the Core Leader, Xuezhi Guo explains how the politics of the “core” leader 
has regulated elite interactions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from Mao Zedong 
to Xi Jinping. His main argument is that CCP elite politics has an “enduring tendency toward 
the ‘core’,” or paramount leader, due to three reasons. The first reason is the powerful influence 
of traditional Chinese political philosophy in defining political legitimacy. He maintains that 
Confucianism, which desires the top ruler to be a moral sage-king, has amalgamated with 
Legalism, which views politics as domination and manipulation, into “Legalized Confucianism” 
to serve as China's de facto ruling ideology since the Han dynasty, resulting in a ruler-centred 
polity. The second reason concerns the centralized and hierarchical structure of a Leninist 
party-state, which makes use of the Party chief's supreme status to entrench one-party 
monopoly. The third reason is the lack of institutionalization of power transition and 
consolidation, which minimizes constraints for the CCP general secretary to use their term of 
office as an “opportunity” to work toward “earning” the status of the “core.” 
Guo's arguments are made on the basis of an in-depth analysis of traditional Chinese 
political thinking. He parses Confucian and Legalist texts and discusses examples of their 
application in ancient times and under the CCP. In addition, drawing on detailed biographical 
analysis and a very extensive literature review, he examines afresh the evolution of 
gerontocracy or mentor politics of veteran leaders, ideological domination, leadership 
transition, and political groupings and factions in the CCP from Mao through Xi. The 
encyclopaedic attention to detail throughout the book is breath-taking. Yet, insofar as the book 
aims to construct an alternative paradigm of elite politics based on traditional Chinese 
philosophy, it is more successful at the theoretical level. In the many case studies that document 
the actual workings of Chinese elite politics in this book, it seems that the effect of traditional 
Chinese thinking on elite behaviour is more assumed than proven. It is sometimes unclear how 
his paradigm sheds light onto the process and outcome of elite interactions hitherto unavailable 
from a clientelist paradigm. 
Despite these limitations, the implications of Guo's arguments are profound for 
understanding Chinese elite politics. First, in contradistinction to the dominant perspective that 
collective leadership has become the norm of post-Deng Xiaoping China, Guo's premise that a 
“core” leader is what is sought by China's political system entails that collective leadership is 
only ever a temporary mechanism when there is no “core” leader – be it due to the Party chief's 
inability to earn the recognition as the “core” (such as Zhao Ziyang, Hu Yaobang, Jiang Zemin 
and Hu Jintao) or, once earned, failure to keep the recognition due to a colossal failure (such 
as Mao after the Great Leap Forward). In Guo's paradigm, it is only in these situations that 
Party elites are allowed to step up to share power with the Party chief and in doing so compete 
with the chief and each other for the “core” status until a “core” can be identified. Guo 
maintains that using collective leadership as a mechanism for power competition is legitimate 
because of the Confucian ethics of meritocratic leadership; moreover, insofar as it is not a 
blatant challenge to the Party chief, which is incompatible to the Confucius admonition of self-
interests, it enables the political system to “self-adjust and self-regulate” as opposed to leaving 
a power vacuum. 
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Second, the “self-adjusting and self-regulating” mechanism between the “core” and elites 
in Guo's paradigm entails that there will be “cyclical change” between collective leadership 
and strongman leadership, since each scenario tends to develop into extremes over time. In the 
case of collective leadership, prolonged competition for the “core” status among elites will 
result in a weak party with rampant corruption, as was the case under Hu Jintao. By contrast, a 
strong “core” leader, such as Mao, tends to gravitate toward arbitrary rule. Guo reasons that 
these extremes would inevitably trigger a survival crisis in the Party, and thus the cyclical 
change from collective to strongman leadership or vice versa. The argument is significant for 
exposing the structural causes and limitations for Xi's strongman leadership. 
Third, Guo's paradigm demonstrates that factionalism is structurally embedded in CCP 
elite politics. This suggests that there are serious constraints to Xi's efforts to stamp out 
factionalism. Guo observes that due to (1) the lack of institutionalized rules governing how to 
earn the recognition of the “core” or the “core-in-waiting,” and (2) the latent competitive 
dynamics between the Party chief and other Party elites, the bureaucracy and veteran Party 
leaders, the Party chief must rely on factions to earn and keep the “core” status. Because Party 
elites in the post-Deng period tend to have ties with multiple factions, even though the Party 
chief has strong motivations to purge his political enemies to help earn or maintain the “core” 
status, it is in his interest not to eliminate any faction completely. 
This book is a treasure trove for advanced research of Chinese elite politics. Some sections 
of the book juxtapose Chinese elite politics with that of other communist systems, and contrast 
Chinese and Western political thoughts. These should be of interest for postgraduate students 
and scholars of political science. 
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